Changing Retirement Behavior in the Wake of the Financial Crisis by Coronado, Julia & Dynan, Karen
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council 
9-1-2011 
Changing Retirement Behavior in the Wake of the Financial Crisis 
Julia Coronado 
BNP Paribas, julia.l.coronado@americas.bnpparibas.com 
Karen Dynan 
Brookings Institute, kdynan@brookings.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Coronado, Julia and Dynan, Karen, "Changing Retirement Behavior in the Wake of the Financial Crisis" 
(2011). Wharton Pension Research Council Working Papers. 171. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/171 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2012 publication: Reshaping Retirement Security: 
Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/171 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Changing Retirement Behavior in the Wake of the Financial Crisis 
Abstract 
The financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession left huge scars on household balance sheets, with 
households approaching retirement seeing the largest decline in wealth. This chapter examines how 
these households have adjusted to these developments. To date, most evidence on this question has 
come from surveys of household intentions. Using data on actual household behavior, we find that 
households nearing retirement are making up for financial losses by increasing saving and deferring 
retirement. They also appear to have reduced financial risk exposure by taking on less leverage and 
moving their portfolios in a more conservative direction. 
Disciplines 
Economics 
Comments 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2012 publication: Reshaping Retirement 
Security: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis. 
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/171 
Reshaping Retirement
Security
Lessons from the Global
Financial Crisis
EDITED BY
Raimond Maurer,
Olivia S. Mitchell,
and Mark J. Warshawsky
1
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/8/2012, SPi
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
# Pension Research Council, the Wharton School, the University of Pennsylvania 2012
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published 2012
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Data available
ISBN 978–0–19–966069–8
Printed in Great Britain by
MPG Books Group, Bodmin and King’s Lynn
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/8/2012, SPi
Contents
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
List of Abbreviations xiv
Notes on Contributors xvii
1. Retirement Security and the Financial and
Economic Crisis: An Overview 1
Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Mark J. Warshawsky
Part I. Rethinking Retirement in the New
Economic Era
2. Changing Retirement Behavior in the Wake of the Financial Crisis 13
Julia Coronado and Karen Dynan
3. Potential Impacts of the Great Recession on Future Retirement
Incomes 36
Barbara A. Butrica, Richard W. Johnson, and Karen E. Smith
4. Effects of the Economic Crisis on the Older Population:
How Expectations, Consumption, Bequests, and
Retirement Responded to Market Shocks 64
Michael Hurd and Susann Rohwedder
5. Retirement Behavior and the Global Financial Crisis 81
Jason J. Fichtner, John W. R. Phillips, and Barbara A. Smith
Part II. Rethinking the Resilience of Defined
Contribution Plans
6. Trading in 401(k) Plans during the Financial Crisis 101
Ning Tang, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Stephen P. Utkus
7. Life Cycle Impacts of the Financial Crisis on Optimal
Consumption—Portfolio Choices and Labor Supply 120
Jingjing Chai, Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Ralph Rogalla
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/8/2012, SPi
8. A Stress Test for the Private Employer Defined
Contribution System 151
David Wray
Part III. How Defined Benefit Plans Handled
the Financial Crisis
9. Defined Benefit Pension Plans and the
Financial Crisis: Impact and Sponsors and
Government Reactions 161
Mark J. Warshawsky
10. Multiemployer Pension Plans Respond to the
Financial Crisis 188
Judith F. Mazo and Eli Greenblum
11. Adopting Hybrid Pension Plans: Effects of Economic
Crisis and Regulatory Reform 215
Robert L. Clark, Alan Glickstein, and Tomeka Hill
12. Collective Pensions and the Global Financial Crisis:
The Case of the Netherlands 235
Lans Bovenberg and Theo Nijman
13. How Have Public Sector Pensions Responded to
the Financial Crisis? 262
Andrew G. Biggs
End Pages 273
Index 277
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/8/2012, SPi
viii Contents
Chapter 2
Changing Retirement Behavior in the
Wake of the Financial Crisis
Julia Coronado and Karen Dynan
The financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession left huge scars on
household balance sheets. Stock prices remain below their peak of the fall
of 2007. Home prices fell more than one-quarter from their 2006 peak and
continue to fall. Households have shed some of their debt (in large part
through defaults), but the decline has not been nearly as large as the
decline in the value of their assets, leaving the ratio of debt to assets well
above its precrisis range. Looking across age groups, households approach-
ing retirement have seen the largest decline in wealth. These households
were in their peak life cycle wealth accumulation years when the crisis hit,
and they were holding much of this wealth in equities or homes. With fewer
years of earnings ahead than their younger counterparts, they have fewer
options to make up for this loss in wealth and must make a number of
significant economic decisions as a result.
This chapter examines how households approaching retirement have
adjusted to these balance sheet developments. To date, much of the
evidence on this question has come from surveys that ask households
how they are adjusting or plan to adjust (cf. Sass et al., 2010; Hurd and
Rohwedder, 2011). Such evidence is useful but remains limited, in that
intentions do not always correspond to actions. This chapter complements
the survey evidence with a careful look at the available data on what house-
holds approaching retirement are actually doing—how households are
adjusting their consumption, labor supply, and asset allocation.
We begin with a review of macroeconomic and financial developments
over the past few years and then explore exactly how these developments
have affected the financial conditions of households in different age
groups. Next, we turn to the different margins on which households may
be adjusting. We look at patterns of consumption and labor supply across
age groups, using past recessions as a benchmark; we also examine finan-
cial decisions, including willingness to borrow and asset allocation.
Whereas the survey evidence is mixed on whether households are adjust-
ing to their wealth losses by trimming their spending, households do seem
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/8/2012, SPi
to have adjusted on this margin. In particular, households on the cusp of
retirement have seen a sharp and broad-based decline in their spending, in
contrast to a fairly muted reduction for households in the age categories on
either side of this group. Patterns of labor force participation by age are
consistent with survey data, indicating a strong inclination toward defer-
ring retirement to make up for the losses. Finally, the financial crisis
appears to have left an imprint on financial behavior, with a significant
reduction in willingness to take on debt and considerable wealth having
been moved out of higher-risk equity funds and into lower-risk bond funds.
Boom and bust in the early 2000s
To set the stage for our analysis, it is useful to briefly review the events of the
past decade and their implications for household finances. Following a brief
and mild recession in 2001, the United States saw considerable run-ups in
stock prices and home prices paired with solid economic growth and low
rates of unemployment. Aggregate household net worth relative to dispos-
able income rose sharply to a high of 6.4 in mid-2007, noticeably above the
peak reached during the stock market bubble of the late 1990s (Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1 Household net worth as a percent of disposable income: 1965–2011
Source : Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2011a).
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Ultimately, the good times proved transitory, however. Home prices began
to decline in 2006, and stock prices turned down in late 2007 (Figure 2.2).
Housing played a special role in the recent economic cycle. In retros-
pect, home values clearly rose above levels that could be justified by
economic fundamentals. Housing has historically been the most widely
held asset among US households, and it became even more broadly
based as homeownership rates rose from the 63–66 percent range observed
between 1965 and 1998 to around 69 percent between 2004 and 2007
(Figure 2.3). The expansion in home ownership was fueled, in part, by a
slackening of mortgage underwriting standards, including a sharp rise in
the prevalence of the so-called ‘affordable’ mortgages. However, many of
these mortgages proved to be unsustainable in the absence of continued
home price appreciation. As home prices began to fall, losses mounted at
financial institutions and many collapsed or threatened to do so. In turn,
credit conditions began to tighten, leading to yet more defaults and credit
losses, until the United States found itself in the most severe financial crisis
and economic downturn since the Great Depression.
Stock ownership has also expanded in recent decades. The Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) conducted by the Federal Reserve Board shows
an increase in stock ownership (both directly and indirectly held) from
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Figure 2.2 US stock and home prices: 1985–2010
Source : National Association of Realtors (2011); Standard and Poor’s (2011a).
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37 percent of households in 1992 to 51 percent in 2007 (Aizcorbe et al.,
2003; Bucks et al., 2009). Homeowners tended to have greater exposure to
stock than renters, with 63 percent holding equity in 2007 (about two-and-
a-half times the corresponding share of renters). Amid the boom in equity
and home values, consumers took on unprecedented amounts of debt. The
ratio of household debt to disposable income (Figure 2.4) rose steadily in
the 1980s and 1990s as the liberalization of financial markets and improve-
ments in technology for assessing risk increased access to credit and low-
ered the cost of borrowing. The trend sharply accelerated in 2002, with
household debt surging above 100 percent of disposable income and
reaching a peak of 130 percent in the third quarter of 2007. Rising debt
levels left household vulnerable to shocks that left them with elevated debt
obligations relative to their available resources (Dynan, 2009).
By early 2009, aggregate stock market wealth was 50 percent below its
peak in October 2007, while the value of aggregate household real estate
holdings were down one-quarter from their peak two years prior. The ratio
of household wealth to disposable income bottomed out at 4.5 in early
2009, its lowest level since the mid-1980s. The combination of elevated debt
burdens and depleted balance sheets left households under enormous
strain. The ratio of debt to asset values, which had shown fairly subdued
growth between 2002 and 2007 because of rising asset values, exploded
upward with the collapse in asset values.
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Figure 2.3 US homeownership rate: 1965–2011
Source : US Census Bureau (2011).
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The recession also had a profound effect on employment conditions.
Nearly 9 million jobs were lost to the downturn. When employment condi-
tions reached their trough in late 2009, the unemployment rate was over
10 percent and the ‘underemployment rate’ (which includes part-time work-
ers that would like to be fully employed and workers not actively seeking a
job because they are discouraged) was 17.2 percent. Since that time, the
economy has remained weak and improved only modestly in terms of
broader conditions and household financial conditions. More than one in
twelve workers is still without a job. Long-term unemployment trends have
been particularly troubling, with the fraction of workers unemployed for
twenty-seven weeks or more, at 4 percent, still well above the range seen for
decades prior to this recession. The ratio of household wealth to income has
recovered a bit, but it remains no higher than it was in the early 1990s.
Impact of the Great Recession on the finances
of different age groups
We use the SCF to explore the effect of the rise and fall of asset prices on
the financial position of households in different age groups: it contains
comprehensive and high-quality information about the balance sheets of
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Figure 2.4 Measures of US household stress resulting from debt: 1965–2011
Source : Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2011a).
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US households, as well as data on household income, demographics, and
attitudes. Conducted by the Federal Reserve Board on a triennial basis
since 1983, the last full wave that is publicly available contains information
collected during the second half of 2007; nevertheless, the Federal Reserve
has recently released data on median net worth for selected demographic
groups from a follow-up survey of the 2007 respondents conducted in the
latter half of 2009.1 In principle, we could use the SCF micro data to group
households by the age ranges most pertinent to this analysis, but we are
limited to ‘standard’ SCF age groupings because the key 2009 data are
presented that way based on the age of household head: younger than
age 35, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, 65–74, and 75+. Households approaching
retirement—the main target of our analysis—are likely to be concentrated
in the 55–64 age group.
Life cycle economic theory predicts that household wealth will peak at
retirement and, indeed, in the SCF, households with heads aged 55–64
tend to have higher wealth than their counterparts in other age groups.
The first column of Table 2.1 shows that median net worth rose with the
age of the head for households in their working years, peaking at $265,000
in the 2007 SCF (measured in 2010 dollars) for households aged 55–64.
Median net worth fell off for older age groups, though the decline is not as
pronounced as the increase during the working years.
Households approaching retirement also tend to have more exposure to
equity price fluctuations. As can be seen in the first panel of Table 2.2, the
share of households owning stock (both directly and indirectly through
mutual funds, defined contribution retirement plans, and the like) in the
55–64 age group was a shade lower than that for the 45–54 age group in
2007 (59 versus 61 percent). Yet conditional on owning stocks, median
stock holdings and the share of assets represented by stocks were consider-
ably higher for the 55–64 age group than for any other age group. The
Table 2.1 Household median net worth in 2007 by
age of head ($ 2010)
Age of head (years) Median net worth ($)
<35 12,268
35–44 90,844
45–54 192,564
55–64 265,063
65–74 250,815
75+ 223,366
Source : Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of
Consumer Finances (FRB, 2011b).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/8/2012, SPi
18 Reshaping Retirement Security
second panel of Table 2.2 shows that households with heads between ages
55 and 64 also had relatively sizable holdings of residential real estate. The
ownership rate was 83 percent for this group—a bit lower than that for the
next age group, but higher than that of other age groups. The median
amount of real estate owned (conditional on owning) was $235,000, also at
the top end of the range for the various age groups.
Although older working households appear to have more risk in terms
of assets than households in other age groups in 2007, the liabilities side
of their balance sheet was not as risky. As can be seen in Table 2.3, at
82 percent, the share of households in the 55–64 age group with debt
(including mortgage obligations as well as any consumer loans) in 2007
Table 2.2 Household assets by age of head: ownership, holdings, and portfolio
shares (in 2007; $ 2010)
Age of
head
(years)
Equity Residential real estate Other financial assets
Share
owning
Median for
owners
Share
owning
Median for
owners
Share
owning
Median for
owners
Amount
($)
Share
of
assets
Amount
($)
Share
of
assets
Amount
($)
Share
of
assets
<35 0.39 7,559 0.06 0.42 183,344 0.79 0.89 5,238 0.10
35–44 0.54 26,925 0.09 0.69 225,251 0.71 0.93 14,772 0.08
45–54 0.61 47,146 0.11 0.79 256,682 0.67 0.93 29,649 0.11
55–64 0.59 82,033 0.15 0.83 246,205 0.58 0.97 40,860 0.13
65–74 0.52 61,289 0.10 0.86 209,536 0.62 0.96 44,107 0.14
75+ 0.40 42,955 0.12 0.79 157,152 0.66 0.97 30,068 0.21
Source : Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (FRB, 2011b).
Table 2.3 Household debt by age of head: ownership, holdings, and ratio to
income (in 2007; $ 2010)
Age of head
(years)
Share with debt Median conditional on having debt
Amount ($) Ratio to income
<35 0.84 37,863 0.91
35–44 0.86 111,054 1.44
45–54 0.87 100,504 1.20
55–64 0.82 63,112 0.98
65–74 0.66 42,043 0.84
75+ 0.31 13,620 0.44
Source : Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (FRB, 2011b).
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was a bit lower than the shares for households in the 35–44 and 45–54 age
groups. Moreover, conditional on having debt, the median amount of debt
and the ratio of debt to income, at about $60,000 and one, were consider-
ably lower for the 55–64 age group than for the next two younger groups.
Table 2.4 pulls this information together, showing the share of aggregate
assets of different types and debt owned by households in different age
groups in 2007. Households with heads between 55 and 64 years old owned
31 percent of equities, 23 percent of residential real estate, and 29 percent
of other financial assets, despite accounting for just 17 percent of the
population (final column). Their share of debt was roughly on par with
their population share, considerably higher than for older households, but
a good bit lower than for households with heads between ages 35 and 54.
Figure 2.5 shows trends in inflation-adjusted median net worth of differ-
ent age groups over time. As can be seen, median net worth in 2009 was
lower than its precrisis value for all age groups, with large declines in the
45–54, 55–64, and 65–74 age groups. At $222,000, median net worth for
those aged 55–64 in the 2009 SCF was down $60,000 from the peak seen for
that age group in the 2004 SCF and was roughly the same as in 2001
SCF. All told, the patterns suggest a considerable hit to the resources of
households approaching retirement relative to what they likely expected
prior to the financial crisis.
While the collapse in asset values had an outsized impact on people
nearing retirement, it does not appear that this age group was dispropor-
tionately hurt by the rapid deterioration in labor market conditions. As
shown in Table 2.5, all age groups experienced a much larger increase in
unemployment relative to prior cycles. However, in percentage terms,
workers aged 55 and older saw a smaller increase in their unemployment
rate than those in other age groups, except for those under the age of 24,
just as in prior recessions. Workers aged 55 and over generally have an
unemployment rate below the national average owing to their greater
Table 2.4 Distribution of selected assets and debt by age of head: 2007
Age of head
(years)
Equities Residential real
estate
Other financial
assets
Debt Memo:
population share
<35 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.19 0.22
35–44 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.26 0.20
45–54 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.21
55–64 0.31 0.23 0.29 0.19 0.17
65–74 0.21 0.15 0.19 0.08 0.11
75+ 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.02 0.11
Source : Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (FRB, 2011b).
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experience and more senior positions, and they currently enjoy the lowest
unemployment rate of any age group. That said, workers nearing retire-
ment certainly experienced far more joblessness and job insecurity than
was typical in the past, and while we cannot break down the long-term
unemployed by age, this group has no doubt been part of this trend at a
time in their life where their remaining work horizon is much shorter than
for younger cohorts. Thus, while they were hit proportionately, the longer-
run damage to their living standard may well be more severe.2
Three margins of adjustment to the crisis
Because of their considerable holdings of financial and real estate assets,
older workers were hurt hardest by the dual decline in equity values and
home prices at a time in their lives when many were likely planning an exit
from the labor force before long. Economic theory tells us that there are a
number of changes in behavior that such a sizable shock to wealth and
income security might elicit. First, older workers might choose to save
more, reducing current consumption in order to reduce the damage to
their planned spending in retirement. Second, this group might choose to
0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
1980 1990 2000 2010
20
10
 d
ol
la
rs
Year
< 35 35–44 45–54
55–64 65–74 75+
Figure 2.5 Median household net worth ($ 2010) by household head age over time
Source : Authors’ calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances (FRB, 2011b).
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stay in the labor force longer than planned. An additional year of work
has a powerful impact on retirement resources, although such a response
will only be available to those for whom work is available. Finally, given
that the losses experienced in the values of stock portfolios and home
values were quite likely well beyond anything most households had
thought was likely or possible, households might reevaluate their risk
tolerance or how to express their risk preferences through changes in
their portfolio allocation. Each of these responses has implications for
household retirement security, as well as for the macroeconomy. We
examine each of these three margins of behavior by looking at both
evidence on what households say they are doing (or planning to do)
and micro and macro data that shed light on what they are doing in
practice.
Changes in saving behavior
Reducing spending and raising saving is one way in which households are
able to rebuild or conserve their life cycle saving. One would expect such
effects to be most pronounced for households nearing retirement and in
retirement given the considerable size of their losses (and, for the retired
group, the greater difficulty of reentering the labor force so as to increase
labor income). Note, though, that households who mainly suffered losses
via lower home values might not have to trim nonhousing spending if they
were planning to live in their homes for the foreseeable future because the
present discounted value of expected housing consumption fell commen-
surately. One would not expect a large wealth effect on the spending of
younger households, since they suffered much smaller losses and they have
many years to restore their retirement saving. However, younger (and
older) households might reduce spending because of a loss in income
regardless of their rate of saving. They also might increase saving for
precautionary reasons if they have raised their assessment of the underlying
riskiness of the economic environment they face. Finally, the tight supply of
credit over the past few years might also have damped consumption,
although one would expect this to be a bigger issue for less creditworthy
younger households and for this effect to fade as credit conditions ease.
Survey evidence on households’ inclination to change their saving behav-
ior in the wake of the crisis is mixed. For example, the Center for Retire-
ment Research at Boston College surveyed roughly 1,300 workers between
the ages of 45 and 59 in mid-2009 about how they were responding to the
financial downturn and found fairly modest reported effects on saving
(Sass et al., 2010). Two-thirds of surveyed households reported no change
in how much they save for retirement through 401(k) accounts, individual
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retirement accounts (IRAs), and other accounts. On the other hand, about
60 percent of respondents to the 2009 SCF between the ages of 50 and 61
reported they would spend less if their wealth decreased; many of these
households also indicated a material increase in their desired precaution-
ary saving (Duke, 2011).
The aggregate evidence suggests that households have significantly
ramped up their saving; the personal saving rate, which bottomed out
between 1 and 2 percent in the years just prior to the financial crisis,
jumped to close to 6 percent during the crisis, and it has remained elevated
even as the recovery has progressed. The current level is similar to that seen
prior to the stock market run-up of the 1990s. It may be that, when asked by
a survey, households think about saving as an active decision to invest
money in a retirement account rather than including paying down debt,
spending less, and keeping larger cash balances on hand. Indeed, while
household debt has been shrinking in large part due to defaults and
charge-offs, a recent analysis by the New York Fed showed that households
actively paid down consumer debt in 2009; and, while net borrowing
turned positive in 2010, it has remained well below prior norms (Brown
et al., 2011).
To explore more concretely how the events of the past several years may
have changed the spending and saving behavior of households (particu-
larly those nearing retirement), we look at patterns of spending using data
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) conducted by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS collects detailed data on expenditures
from roughly 7,000 households per quarter, with each household
providing this information for up to four successive quarters before being
rotated out of the sample. Limited information about the income, demo-
graphic characteristics, assets, and liabilities of the respondents is also
gathered.
Annual averages of CEX variables by demographic group are published
on the US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics website.3 Our
analysis focuses on a measure of consumption spending that roughly
matches the Personal Consumption Expenditures concept in the National
Income and Product Accounts excluding direct spending on housing (rent
and owners’ imputed rent). We exclude rent and owners’ imputed rent
because changes in these categories have a strong relationship to house
price movements, and so may represent households’ investment decisions,
in addition to their consumption decisions. However, the results would not
be materially different if we were to focus on total consumption. To
construct our consumption measure, we start with total CEX expenditures
and then subtract mortgage payments, property tax and insurance expen-
ditures, home maintenance expenditures, rent payments, and pension and
life insurance expenditures.
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As a check on the data, Figure 2.6 shows trends in the levels of after-tax
income, nonhousing consumption, and home values. Past studies have
shown that CEX aggregates do not track national accounts data very tightly
over time, for a variety of purported reasons, including conceptual differ-
ences in the measures, limited coverage of high-income households, and
trends in the degree of underreporting.4 Still, one would expect the
patterns to make some sense in the context of macroeconomic develop-
ments, and they do. Average consumption and income both declined after
the onset of the recession in late 2007, with consumption declining more
than income, consistent with a rise in the saving rate. The average value of
owned homes peaked in 2006 and fell thereafter, returning by 2009 to its
lowest value since 2004.
By age group (not shown), average household income and consumption
are highest for households with heads between ages 45 and 54 and lowest
for households with heads aged 65+. Households with heads aged 45–64
have the highest average home value, with households with heads younger
than 35 having the lowest. This pattern likely reflects in part the younger
households having a lower homeownership rate (recall that these are not
conditional averages)—the percent of these households owning a home
over the past decade averaged 48 percent, compared with 75–80 percent
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Figure 2.6 US average household income, consumption, and home value over time
Source : Authors’ calculations from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (BLS, 2011a).
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for the middle-aged groups. Households in the oldest group also had a
homeownership rate of around 80 percent, though a slightly lower average
home value. The percent decline in house prices from their peak level was
largest for households in the 25–34 age group (26 percent), with these
households experiencing the largest drop in homeownership (4 percent-
age points). For other age groups, the decline in average home value was in
the neighborhood of 15 percent.
The heart of our analysis of the CEX data focuses on changes in spending
between the business cycle peak and two years later. Thus, for the latest
recession, we consider changes between 2007 and 2009. We compare results
across several dimensions. We look across age groups, with a focus on house-
holds with heads between 55 and 64, as that group is the most likely to be on
the cusp of retirement.5 We also look across business cycles, comparing
changes from the current episode with those experienced during the reces-
sion in the early 2000s. For this earlier cycle, we calculate changes between
2000 and 2002, as high-frequency data put the start of the recession in early
2001, implying that the peak based on annual averages was 2000. In order to
abstract from the influence of differential price trends over the two periods,
we divide all variables by the deflator for Personal Consumption Expendi-
tures from the National Income Accounts. Finally, we compare results across
selected categories of spending, since relative movements in the more dis-
cretionary or credit-sensitive categories may also be telling about how the
financial crisis and recession affected households’ behavior.
Table 2.5 shows our results. Looking at changes for the 2007–9 period
(Column 3), households with heads in the 55–64 age group show a much
larger drop in nonhousing consumption than their counterparts in the
next youngest category. The larger drop likely in part reflects the larger
drop in after-tax income they experienced (bottom panel of table), but the
difference in the income change is much smaller than that in the con-
sumption change.6 Younger households (those with heads aged 25–44)
also experienced fairly large drops in nonhousing consumption between
2007 and 2009. These households experienced smaller income declines
than that in the group aged 55–64, and they also experienced smaller
declines in wealth (in dollar terms). However, as discussed later, younger
households tend to be more reliant on credit and thus may have beenmore
constrained by the tightness in credit conditions. The decline in nonhous-
ing consumption for those aged 55–64 stands out when the 2007–9 changes
are compared to those observed in the previous business cycle (Column 4).
All age groups showed noticeably weaker consumption in the recent episode,
but the biggest difference by far was for those approaching retirement.
Spending patterns for the oldest age group (households with heads 65
and above) are somewhat puzzling. One might have expected spending to
weaken most noticeably in this group given the greater difficultly it
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presumably had adjusting its labor supply. However, the response of this
group for the 2007–9 period was among the most muted, both in absolute
terms and relative to the last recession. One possibility is that these house-
holds viewed their future retirement income streams as safe, relative to
those of households exposed to risk from job loss. This oldest cohort
has relatively high levels of defined benefit pension coverage, and though
these plans have become severely underfunded as a result of the crisis,
those receiving benefits have been unaffected. In addition, those older
households still owning their homes may have been planning to stay in
these homes so that the drop in home values translated into lower implicit
Table 2.5 Changes in real spending and income by age of head: 2002–9
Age of head
(years)
% change Difference in changes
2000–2 2007–9
Nonhousing consumption 25–34 1.6 7.9 6.3
35–44 1.7 7.7 9.4
45–54 0.1 2.2 2.3
55–64 6.6 8.3 14.8
65+ 1.4 1.7 3.1
Food expenditures 25–34 0.7 0.7 1.4
35–44 0.3 1.4 1.1
45–54 4.2 0.2 4.4
55–64 4.1 2.4 6.6
65+ 3.7 4.9 1.2
Apparel expenditures 25–34 6.5 14.2 7.7
35–44 12.4 2.9 9.5
45–54 17.2 16.9 0.3
55–64 2.4 18.6 20.9
65+ 1.7 0.8 2.5
Vehicle expenditures 25–34 0.2 30.7 30.5
35–44 11.3 36.2 47.5
45–54 5.3 3.1 8.4
55–64 3.7 20.6 24.3
65+ 7.6 9.0 1.4
After-tax income 25–34 4.5 .5 5.1
35–44 5.4 2.8 8.2
45–54 6.8 2.9 9.7
55–64 7.0 4.0 11.0
65+ 14.1 4.4 18.5
Note: Relative to the business cycle peak.
Source : Authors’ calculations from various Consumer Expenditure Surveys (BLS, 2011a).
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future rent. That said, given the SCF evidence that this group saw a very
large decline in its net worth, the issue warrants more investigation.
Comparing responses across categories of spending, food consumption
showed much smaller declines for all age groups than broader consump-
tion (and, in some cases, it increased). This pattern is consistent with
food being more of a necessity than other types of goods and services.
By contrast, spending in the more discretionary categories, such as apparel
and, in particular, motor vehicles, fell much more noticeably. For house-
holds with heads aged 55–64, apparel spending fell close to 20 percent
between 2007 and 2009, in sharp contrast to the modest rise seen between
2000 and 2002. Spending by this group on vehicles fell similarly. Of note,
households in the two youngest age groups saw an even larger decline in
spending on vehicles between 2007 and 2009, though not in spending on
apparel. This pattern could reflect the sharply reduced availability of auto
loans, given that younger households tend to hold fewer liquid assets and
thus presumably are more reliant on credit to finance large purchases.7
To recap, both data limitations and the complicated nature of the
underlying economic environment preclude us from drawing very precise
conclusions. Roughly speaking, though, the patterns suggest that tight
credit conditions limited the spending of households with heads younger
than age 45. Equally striking are the patterns for older households, pre-
sumably less likely to be constrained by credit availability. The spending of
households with heads between ages 45–54 and 65+ showed a fairly slight
weakening after the recession began. However, the group bracketed by
these two age categories—where households approaching retirement are
concentrated—declined in a sharp and broad-based way. This pattern is
consistent with the view that these households, at least in part, are attempt-
ing to make up for their financial losses (and perhaps lower expected
future returns) by cutting consumption and raising saving.
Changes in labor supply
A particularly powerful way for those nearing retirement to make up for
financial losses is to defer retirement, as a year of additional earnings can
make a considerably larger difference than raising one’s saving rate by a few
percentage points even for several years. The likely labor supply effect
would probably be smaller for younger households, given their smaller
financial losses and for retired households, who presumably find it harder
and less desirable to reenter the labor force.
There is some evidence that many households have extended their
planned retirement ages. Roughly, 40 percent of respondents reported
delaying their retirement dates, with most intending to work longer by
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four or more years (Sass et al., 2010). Two-thirds of preretirement SCF
respondents reported that they expected to delay retirement by a year or
more relative to their expectations in 2007 (Duke, 2011). Likewise, the
Employee Benefit Research Institute (2011) shows between 20 and 25
percent of workers reporting delaying their retirement each year after
2009, up from a range of 10–15 percent before the crisis. The vast majority
cited changes in employment prospects or finances as reasons for the delay.
Similarly, the percentage of respondents saying they expect to retire at age
70 or later shot up from 16 percent in 2006 to 25 percent in 2011. Clearly,
for older workers who are still employed, delaying retirement is a strong
margin of preference to shore up resources.
The labor force participation response also shows up in the macroecon-
omic data when we look at changes in men’s labor force participation
by age group across this and prior business cycles.8 The behavior of men
aged 55+ stands in stark contrast to other age groups (Table 2.6). Labor
force participation generally declines a bit during recessions, with the
youngest and oldest households seeing the largest changes. During the
Great Recession, all of the younger age groups saw pronounced declines
in participation and the aggregate labor force participation rate dropped
Table 2.6 Employment conditions and choices by age, through the recession
Age
group
(years)
June 2011 Peak-to-trough change in
current cycle
Average for past recessions
First difference % change First difference % change
Unemployment rate
All 9.2 5.7 130 3.5 90
16–24 17.3 9.2 93 5.6 67
25–34 9.6 6.4 145 3.8 112
35–44 7.8 5.8 176 3.0 114
45–54 7.3 4.7 152 2.5 100
55+ 7.0 3.8 119 2.2 86
Labor force
All 70.5 1.4 1.9 0.2 0.3
16–24 55.9 3.9 6.4 1.0 1.4
25–34 89.1 1.9 2.1 0.1 0.1
35–44 91.6 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.1
45–54 86.4 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1
55+ 46.6 1.0 2.2 0.6 1.0
Note : Change from May 2007 (recent low for overall unemployment rate) to October 2009
(recent high for overall unemployment rate).
Source : Authors’ calculations from the US Department of Labor (BLS, 2011b).
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1.4 percentage points. However, workers aged 55+ actually increased their
rate of participation by 1 percentage point over the period (and have
seen further increases, on net, since then). This continues a long-term
trend that probably reflects declining pension coverage and increasing
life expectancies among other factors, but its resilience during a reces-
sion, when all other age groups are leaving the labor force, is a striking
indication that an important way to recoup lost resources is through
continued work. The exception is for older workers who lost their jobs
through the downturn and have had a hard time finding work; this group
will have to rely on increased saving or simply accept reduced consump-
tion in retirement.
Changes in portfolio allocation
A final margin on which one might expect to see some adjustment is the
way in which households allocate their portfolios. Although it is possible
that some households might move into higher-return riskier investments to
make up for their losses, a more plausible story is that they have shifted to a
more cautious position, having lived through a painful illustration of the
downsides of taking on risk.
The Bricker et al. (2011) analysis of the 2007 and 2009 waves of the SCF
concluded that balance sheet changes over this period primarily reflected
changes in asset values, rather than changes in the composition of house-
hold portfolios. However, the attitudinal question in the survey pointed to
a material decline in households’ willingness to take risk. Among house-
holds with heads aged 50–61, the share of households unwilling to take any
financial risk increased by 5–10 percentage points (Duke, 2011). Another
survey found that 30 percent of respondents reported changing the alloca-
tion of their retirement accounts, with most in this category shifting away
from stocks (Sass et al., 2010).
There is also evidence in aggregate data for what is either a change in
risk preferences or a recalibration of how to express risk tolerance, in
light of the magnitude of recent shocks. The reduction in active con-
sumer borrowing noted earlier may in part reflect a reduced taste for
debt. This would be consistent with the fact that the repayment rate on
credit cards is at the high end of its historical range (Figure 2.7). Some of
this is probably related to supply—those consumers who still have access
to credit are more creditworthy and inclined to pay down debt. Supply
factors also probably are one influence on another trend: that toward
‘cash-in’ mortgage refinancings. The share of ‘cash-out’ mortgage refin-
ancings (those that involved an increase of more than 5 percent of the
balance) reached 88 percent at the peak of the housing boom, but has
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since plunged to less than 30 percent. Meanwhile, the share of recent
refinancing transactions involving the pay down of principal (‘cash-in’
refinancing) has been quite elevated by historical standards (Figure 2.8).
Declining home values and home equity, and tightening credit standards,
probably mean that to access current low rates homeowners are required
by lenders to pay down principal in many cases. But the fact that they are
willing to do so, even in light of declining home values, is impressive.
Perhaps the traditional retirement behavior of paying off the mortgage
evidenced by the very low debt holdings of households aged 65+ is
reasserting itself.
In addition to a reduced taste for leverage, households also appear to be
channeling their financial assets into less risky investments. As shown in
Figure 2.9, mutual fund flows into fixed income bond funds were massive
following the crisis, outstripping the magnitude of stock market inflows
seen in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, equity mutual funds have seen net
outflows in recent years that only recently turned positive. Thus, while
the stock market has staged an impressive rally in the past two years,
fewer investors have benefited from it. Figure 2.10 shows that stock market
trading volumes are well down from their peaks and are nearing volumes
that predate the last two stock booms. As more data become available, we
will be able to tell with greater precision whether it is the older generation
driving this trend. Yet, because they hold most of the stock wealth, they
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have reason to be more cautious given their reduced horizon for making
up losses. Surveys suggest a reduced interest in equity investments, so the
likelihood is that older workers’ portfolios have shifted.
Conclusion
Evidence on consumption and labor force participation over the past
several years suggests that households nearing retirement are making up
for financial losses by increasing saving and deferring retirement. They also
appear to have reduced financial risk exposure by taking on less leverage
and moving their portfolios in a more conservative direction. These find-
ings complement survey data indicating that households were inclined to
make such changes to their behavior.
In addition to responding to financial losses experienced during the
Great Recession, households are also forming expectations around how
they believe large unfunded liabilities in public and private pensions and
health care programs are likely to be resolved. The losses suffered in recent
years probably understate the overall loss of retirement resources. A key
question is whether the behavioral changes discussed in this chapter will be
sufficient to allow older households approaching retirement to avoid
making a material cut in their retirement standards of living. This question
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Figure 2.10 New York Stock Exchange trading volumes: 1995–2011
Source : New York Stock Exchange (2011).
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should be a priority for future research as individual- and household-level
data become available for this period and the years that follow.
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Endnotes
1. For more description of the follow-up survey, see Bricker et al. (2011).
2. For further discussion of possible long-run implications, see Tang et al. (2012).
3. See http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxstnd.htm
4. See, for example, Attanasio (1998).
5. A sharper test would involve isolating patterns for the nonretired households in
this group, but we do not have these data. We can say, though, that households
approaching retirement look to be concentrated in this group, as the average
number of earners per household is a little lower than that for the next youngest
group, and much higher than that for the next oldest group.
6. These income changes should be taken with a grain of salt, given that the core
mission of the survey is really to collect expenditure information and many
researchers over the years have expressed doubts about their degree of accuracy.
Similar reasoning is behind our decision not to conduct the analysis in terms of
saving rates.
7. The greater presumed credit dependence of this group is consistent with find-
ings by Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and others that consumption tracks
income much more closely for households with heads below the age of 40.
8. We concentrate on men, as women’s labor force participation has exhibited a
structural increase in recent decades that make cyclical patterns more difficult to
detect.
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